The Mirage of Air Supremacy: Why Aerial Campaigns Fail to Deliver Strategic Victories in Iran

In recent political maneuvers, U.S. President Donald Trump has once again signaled a willingness to escalate aerial operations against Iran. However, a critical analysis of the ongoing conflict reveals a sobering reality: the relentless barrage of American airstrikes has failed to force a strategic surrender from Tehran. This predicament highlights a shared military lesson for both the United States and Russia—that possessing absolute air superiority does not automatically translate into a decisive strategic victory.

Since late February, the U.S. military has launched thousands of sorties against Iranian targets. Yet, these efforts have not succeeded in toppling the government in Tehran, eliminating its long-range missile capabilities, or stripping the regime of its leverage over the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. The inability to achieve these goals suggests a gap between tactical success—hitting a target—and strategic success—changing the enemy's behavior.

This pattern is mirrored in the current conflict in Ukraine. As the front lines remain largely stagnant, both sides have leaned heavily on drones and long-range missiles. In this environment, the advantage has shifted; victory is no longer determined by who can strike the most targets, but rather by who possesses the most resilient and sophisticated air defense systems to withstand such attacks.

Patty Johnson, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, argues that the U.S. has already exhausted most of its high-value aerial targets in Iran. According to Johnson, the remaining objectives are largely insignificant. Destroying these secondary targets is unlikely to cripple Iran's asymmetric warfare capabilities or undermine the regime's grip on its own population. This suggests a point of diminishing returns where further bombing yields little to no strategic benefit.

Historically, the U.S. has invested heavily in air power to avoid the high human cost of ground invasions. However, history warns against this reliance. During the Vietnam War, 'Operation Rolling Thunder' saw the U.S. relentlessly bomb North Vietnamese infrastructure and logistics. Despite the intensity, the campaign failed to stop the flow of supplies, which continued to reach the front lines via rudimentary means such as bicycles and human porters.

Similarly, the 1991 Gulf War provides a cautionary tale. While the air campaign against Iraq was the most intense in history at the time, it did not collapse Saddam Hussein's regime or completely dismantle his army. It took a massive mobilization of hundreds of thousands of ground troops to finally expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. These examples reinforce the idea that air power is a supporting tool rather than a standalone solution for regime change.

The logistical and financial toll of the current campaign against Iran is staggering. Over five months, the U.S. has expended more than $25 billion on aircraft, cruise missiles, and other ordnance, executing over 10,000 strikes. However, the sustainability of this pace is questionable. Sources indicate that available firepower has dwindled since the start of the conflict, with approximately 40% of the bombers involved in the campaign having already been rotated out of the theater.

Furthermore, the depletion of precision-guided munitions has reached a critical level. The U.S. has utilized over 1,100 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM-ER) and 900 Tomahawk missiles. Given that the annual production of these weapons is only in the hundreds, the U.S. is consuming its stockpiles far faster than they can be replenished.

While the U.S. struggles with inventory, Iran's resilience remains a significant concern. Some analysts suggest that as much as 75% of Iran's long-range strike capabilities remain operational. Grieco, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, points out a terrifying asymmetry: even if the U.S. managed to destroy 95% of Iran's arsenal, the remaining 5% would still be sufficient to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, potentially triggering a global economic crisis. This underscores the fundamental limitation of air power in the face of a determined adversary with decentralized asymmetric capabilities.